June 26, 1936
Sanctions have been dropped with a dull thud. An inglorious chapter in British foreign policy has closed. There was very little doubt among all parties of the House of Commons that this particular step had become inevitable. Even Mr. Lloyd George, while blaming the Government, has declared that in the form in which they were applied, sanctions were contemptible. The Government had therefore no difficulty in proving that the policy they had pursued so long, about which they had delivered so many inspiring speeches, in the name of which they had gained notable advantages at the election, was vain and futile. But before it drifts away down the stream let us just look at Mr. Baldwin's Sanctions policy. Was it ever likely to be effective; was it real or sham?
I began to understand the details of these sanctions only at the beginning of this year, when I discovered the principle upon which they were founded. Parliament ought to have found this out at the beginning. From first to last the sanctions policy stood upon a non-rational basis. First the Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly he was resolved that there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently impossible to comply with these three conditions. We can see now that they were bound to result in fiasco. At an early stage Signor Mussolini let it be known that he would submit to sanctions which merely inflicted hardship upon the Italian people, but that if they hampered the operations of his armies against Abyssinia, he would regard them as an act of war. He thought that any privations or inconvenience, inflicted upon the Italian people would have the effect of rallying them more strongly around him. He thought he could use the pressure of sanctions to make Italy a more completely self-contained and war-mobilised country. The result has vindicated his judgment. What he would not stand was anything that prevented his armies from conquering Abyssinia.
Consciously or unconsciously, unconsciously we must hope, the League of Nations Committee charged with devising sanctions conformed docilely to the limitations prescribed by the Aggressor. They proceeded to the rescue of Abyssinia on the basis that nothing must be done to hamper the invading Italian armies. Let me give some instances. We all know how important aluminium is for war purposes. The export of aluminium into Italy was strictly forbidden by the League of Nations. But aluminium is almost the only metal that Italy produces in quantities beyond her own needs. The importation of scrap iron and iron ore into Italy was sternly vetoed, in the name of public justice. But the Italian metallurgical industry makes but little use of these, and as steel billets and pig iron were not interfered with, Italy suffered no hindrance. It would be easy to multiply these examples. Thus the sanctions which we have been pressing with so great a parade were not real sanctions to paralyse the invader, but merely such halfhearted sanctions as the invader would tolerate, because in fact they stimulated Italian war spirit.
It is true that included in the sanctions were many measures, especially financial measures, which in the long run would have destroyed the Italian financial power to purchase necessities in foreign countries, and that these would have eventually affected their war-making capacity. But the chief of these, the financial sanctions, did not require Geneva to impose them. The credit of Italy had already fallen, and was bound to fall, so low that the ordinary market factors would have been as valid as the League decision. The League of Nations, therefore, embarked upon a policy of sanctions which were largely illusory, many of which arose naturally in any case, and the effects of all of which must require a long time. The general policy at Geneva was 'Sanctions with no teeth in them.' I must frankly confess that I was not aware of this until a few months ago.
It is therefore not true to say that economic sanctions have failed. It was the will power to enforce them in a real and biting manner which failed. It failed because of the mental reservation of the principal Powers concerned that nothing must be done which would provoke a war. If economic sanctions had been imposed with ruthless vigour from the outset, they would have crippled the invading armies. But before this happened Signor Mussolini would have attacked the British Fleet, or let it be known that he would, and therefore, as war was not to be contemplated, it was not possible to press them in an effective manner. Let it, however, be clearly understood that of all the Sanction-imposing Powers Great Britain was the most honest. She executed her part with punctilio; hers was the greatest loss, and had war resulted through an international over-stepping of Mussolini's line, it was Great Britain which would have borne practically the whole brunt.
The morals which result are these. First, do not deal in shams. Second, if it is known that you do not mean to fight, and will do nothing which forces the other side to attack you, it is better not to take a leading part in fierce quarrels. Leadership cannot exist upon the principle of limited liability. Let us hope that these lessons will be digested, not only by the British people but by all the other nations. Not one of them can point a finger of scorn at us, except for our leadership, without at the same time in a greater measure condemning themselves. There is overwhelming reason to condemn the weak and bluffing course, which, no doubt from the best motives, has been followed. There is no reason to despair of collective action against the Aggressor. If a sufficient number of powerfully armed nations were ready to enforce economic sanctions, the Aggressor would in many cases have to submit or attack the combination.
The League has made its first feeble essay in action. Let us hope that next time it will either go in with ovemhelming force, or stand clear.