589 Whether that which employs and exerts the force of a community deserves not to be well considered and well understood?
590 Whether the immediate mover, the blood and spirits, be not money, paper, or metal; and whether the soul or will of the community, which is the prime mover that governs and directs the whole, be not the legislature?
591 Supposing the inhabitants of a country quite sunk in sloth, or even fast asleep, whether, upon the gradual awakening and exertion, first of the sensitive and locomotive faculties, next of reason and reflexion, then of justice and piety, the momentum of such country or State would not, in proportion thereunto, become still more and more considerable?
592 Whether that which in the growth is last attained, and is the finishing perfection of a people, be not the first thing lost in their declension?
593 Whether force be not of consequence, as it is exerted; and whether great force without great wisdom may not be a nuisance?
594 Whether the force of a child, applied with art, may not produce greater effects than that of a giant? And whether a small stock in the hands of a wise State may not go further, and produce more considerable effects, than immense sums in the hands of a foolish one?
595 Whose fault is it if poor Ireland still continues poor?
QUERIES OMITTED
Part I
29 Whether, nevertheless, the damage would be very considerable, if by degrees our money were brought back to the English value there to rest for ever?
30 Whether the English crown did not formerly pass with us for six shillings? And what inconvenience ensued to the public upon its reduction to the present value, and whether what hath been may not be?
52 Whether it be not a bull to call that making an interest, whereby a man spendeth much and gaineth nothing?
55 Whether cunning be not one thing and good sense another? and whether a cunning tradesman doth not stand in his own light?
62 Whether, consequently, the fine gentlemen, whose employment is only to dress, drink, and play, be not a pubic nuisance?
73 Whether those specimens of our own manufacture, hung up in a certain public place, do not sufficiently declare such our ignorance? and whether for the honour of the nation they ought not to be removed?
201 Whether any nation ever was in greater want of such an expedient than Ireland?
209 Whether the public may not as well save the interest which it now pays?
210 What would happen if two of our banks should break at once?
And whether it be wise to neglect providing against an event which experience hath shewn us not to be impossible?
211 Whether such an accident would not particularly affect the bankers? And therefore whether a national bank would not be a security even to private bankers?
212 Whether we may not easily avoid the inconveniencies attending the paper-money of New England, which were incurred by their issuing too great a quantity of notes, by their having no silver in bank to exchange for notes, by their not insisting upon repayment of the loans at the time prefixed, and especially by their want of manufactures to answer their imports from Europe?
213 Whether a combination of bankers might not do wonders, and whether bankers know their own strength?
214 Whether a bank in private hands might not even overturn a government? and whether this was not the case of the Bank of St.
George in Genoa?
215 Whether we may not easily prevent the ill effects of such a bank as Mr Law proposed for Scotland, which was faulty in not limiting the quantum of bills, and permitting all persons to take out what bills they pleased, upon the mortgage of lands, whence by a glut of paper, the prices of things must rise? Whence also the fortunes of men must increase in denomination, though not in value; whence pride, idleness, and beggary?
216 Whether such banks as those of England and Scotland might not be attended with great inconveniences, as lodging too much power in the hands of private men, and giving handle for monopolies, stock-jobbing, and destructive schemes?
217 Whether the national bank, projected by an anonymous writer in the latter end of Queen Anne's reign, might not on the other hand be attended with as great inconveniencies by lodging too much power in the Government?
218 Whether the bank projected by Murray, though it partake, in many useful particulars, with that of Amsterdam, yet, as it placeth too great power in the hands of a private society, might not be dangerous to the public?
221 Whether those effects could have happened had there been no stock-jobbing? And whether stock-jobbing could at first have been set on foot, without an imaginary foundation of some improvement to the stock by trade? Whether, therefore, when there are no such prospects, or cheats, or private schemes proposed, the same effects can be justly feared?
222 Whether by a national bank, be not properly understood a bank, not only established by public authority as the Bank of England, but a bank in the hands of the public, wherein there are no shares: whereof the public alone is proprietor, and reaps all the benefit?
223 Whether, having considered the conveniencies of banking and paper-credit in some countries, and the inconveniencies thereof in others, we may not contrive to adopt the former, and avoid the latter?
224 Whether great evils, to which other schemes are liable, may not be prevented, by excluding the managers of the bank from a share in the legislature?
226 Whether the bank proposed to be established in Ireland, under the notion of a national bank, by the voluntary subscription of three hundred thousand pounds, to pay off the national debt, the interest of which sum to be paid the subscribers, subject to certain terms of redemption, be not in reality a private bank, as those of England and Scotland, which are national only in name, being in the hands of particular persons, and making dividends on the money paid in by subscribers?