24 Whether experience and example be not the plainest proof; and whether any instance can be assigned where a national bank hath not been attended with great advantage to the public?
25 Whether the evils apprehended from a national bank are not much more to be apprehended from private banks; but whether men by custom are not familiarized and reconciled to common dangers, which are therefore thought less than they really are?
26 Whether it would not be very hard to suppose all sense, honesty, and public spirit were in the keeping of only a few private men, and the public was not fit to be trusted?
27 Whether it be not ridiculous to suppose a legislature should be afraid to trust itself?
28 But, whether a private interest be not generally supported and pursued with more zeal than a public?
30 Whether, nevertheless, the community of danger, which lulls private men asleep, ought not to awaken the public?
31 Whether there be not less security where there are more temptations and fewer checks?
32 If a man is to risk his fortune, whether it be more prudent to risk it on the credit of private men, or in that of the great assembly of the nation?
33 Where is it most reasonable to expect wise and punctual dealing, whether in a secret impenetrable recess, where credit depends on secrecy, or in a public management regulated and inspected by Parliament?
34 Whether a supine security be not catching, and whether numbers running the same risk, as they lessen the caution, may not increase the danger?
35 What real objection lies against a national bank erected by the legislature, and in the management of public deputies, appointed and inspected by the legislature?
36 What have we to fear from such a bank, which may not be as well feared without it?
37 How, why, by what means, or for what end, should it become an instrument of oppression?
38 Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we are already? Whether it be not in the power of any particular person at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign parts? or whether there can be any security in an estate of land when the demands upon it are unknown?
39 Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a concurrence of the government, be not very practicable?
40 But, whether though a scheme be never so evidently practicable and useful to the pubic, yet, if conceived to interfere with a private interest, it be not forthwith in danger of appearing doubtful, difficult, and impracticable?
41 Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient power to hurt, if they may be supposed capable of it, and whether a bank would give them any new power?
42 What should tempt the pubic to defraud itself?
43 Whether, if the legislature destroyed the public, it would not be felo de se; and whether it be reasonable to suppose it bent on its own destruction?
44 Whether the objection to a pubic national bank, from want of secrecy, be not in truth an argument for it?
45 Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing that renders them so hazardous? and whether, without that, there could have been of late so many sufferers?
46 Whether when all objections are answered it be still incumbent to answer surmises?
47 Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be against any proposal they could not turn into a job?
48 Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private banker, and regularly visited his books, would not money lodged in his bank be therefore reckoned more secure?
49 In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be trusted, what security can there be for trusting any one else?
50 If it be not ridiculous to question whether the pubic can find cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited value?
53 Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend private banks can be admitted as objections against a public one?
54 Whether that which is an objection to everything be an objection to anything; and whether the possibility of an abuse be not of that kind?
55 Whether, in fact, all things are not more or less abused, and yet notwithstanding such abuse, whether many things are not upon the whole expedient and useful?
56 Whether those things that are subject to the most general inspection are not the least subject to abuse?
57 Whether, for private ends, it may not be sometimes expedient to object novelty to things that have been often tried, difficulty to the plainest things, and hazard to the safest?
58 Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question was between money and credit, and not (as in fact it is) which ought to be preferred, private credit or public credit?
59 Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt, or to be feared, on one side?
60 Whether, therefore, those that would make an impartial judgment ought not to be on their guard, keeping both prospects always in view, balancing the inconveniencies on each side and considering neither absolutely?
61 Whether wilful mistakes, examples without a likeness, and general addresses to the passions are not often more successful than arguments?
62 Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as to explain obscure ones?
63 Whether private men are not often an over-match for the public; want of weight being made up for by activity?
64 If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or representatives, whether we are not already undone, and so have nothing further to fear?
65 Suppose a power in the government to hurt the pubic by means of a national bank, yet what should give them the will to do this? Or supposing a will to do mischief, yet how could a national bank, modelled and administered by Parliament, put it in their power?
66 Whether even a wicked will entrusted with power can be supposed to abuse it for no end?
67 Whether it be not much more probable that those who maketh such objections do not believe them?