There is no disquisition more essential either in morality or politics than that which shall tend to give us clear and distinct ideas of good and evil， what it is we should desire， and what we should deprecate. We will therefore close the present volume with a few considerations upon this head.
The nature of good and evil， which is one of the plainest subjects upon which the human mind can be engaged， has been obscured by two sets of men：第一章hose who， from an eagerness to refine and exalt beyond measure the nature of virtue， have elevated it into something impossible and unmeaning： and those who， spurning the narrow limits science and human understanding， have turned system-builders， and fabricated a universe after their own peculiar fancy. We shall see， as we proceed， what has been the operation of these two errors. In the mean time it may be most safe， to examine the subject in its genuine simplicity， uninfluenced by the preconceptions of party.
Good is a general name， including pleasure， and the means by which pleasure is procured. Evil is a general name， including pain， and the means by which pain is produced. Of the two things included in these general names， the first is cardinal and substantive， the second has no intrinsic recommendations but depends for its value on the other. Pleasure therefore is to be termed an absolute good； the means of pleasure are only relatively good. The same observation may be stated of pain.
We inhabit a world where sensations do not come detached， but where everything is linked and connected together. Of consequence， among things absolutely good there may be two classes. There are some things that are good and only good， pleasures that do not draw after them mischief， anguish and remorse. There may be other pleasures that are attended in the sequel with an overbalance of pain， and which， though absolutely good， are relatively evil. There may also be pains which， taken together with their consequences， are salutary. But this does not alter the original proposition： where there is a mixture of evil， all is not good； just as， where there is a mixture of pain， all is not pleasure.
Let us see how this statement affects the theory and practice of virtue.
First， we are hereby enabled to detect their mistake， who denied that "pleasure was the supreme good." The error of the Epicurean philosophers seems to have been， not in affirming that "pleasure was the supreme good，"第一章or this cannot be refuted； but in confining that pleasure which is the proper scope of human actions， to the pleasure of the individual who acts， and not admitting that the pleasures of others was an object which， of its own sake， could， and ought to be pursued.
That "pleasure is the supreme good，" cannot be denied by him who is sufficiently attentive to the meaning of words. That which will give pleasure neither to ourselves nor others， and from which the fruits of joy can be reaped， in no stage， and at no period， is necessarily good for nothing.
The opposers of the Epicurean maxim， were terrified by a consequence which they hastily concluded might be built upon it. If pleasure were the only thing that is worthy to be desired， they thought that every man might reasonably be justified in "walking in the fight of his own eyes，" and there would be no longer any rule of human conduct. Each man might say， "Pleasure is the proper object of my pursuit； I best know what pleases me； and therefore， however opposite is the plan of my conduct to your conceptions， it is unreasonable and unjust for you to interfere with me."
An inference the opposite of this， might， with more propriety， have been drawn from the maxim upon which we are descanting. Is "pleasure the only good？" Then have we the most cogent reason for studying pleasure， and reducing it to a science， and not for leaving every man to pursue his own particular taste， which is nothing more than the result of his education， and of the circumstances in which he happens to have been placed， and which by other lessons and circumstances may be corrected.
No man is entitled to complain of my sober and dispassionate expostulations respecting the species of pleasure he thinks proper to pursue， because no man stands alone， and can pursue his private conceptions of pleasure， without affecting， beneficially or injuriously， the persons immediately connected with him， and， through them， the rest of the world. Even if he have persuaded himself that it is his business to pursue his own pleasure， and that he is not bound to attend ultimately to the pleasure of others， yet it may easily be shown that it is， generally speaking， the interest of each individual， that all should form their plan of personal pleasure with a spirit of deference and accommodation to the pleasure of each other.
But putting the circumstance of the action and re-action of men in society out of the question， still there will be a science of pleasure， and it will be idle and erroneous to consider each man separately， and leave each to find his source of pleasure suitable to his particular humour. We have a common nature， and that common nature out to be consulted. There is one thing， or series of things， that constitutes the true perfection of man.
In the discussions that took place a few years ago， in the English parliament and nation， respecting the slave-trade， the sentiment we are here combating， was used as a topic of argument， by some of those persons who， from certain deplorable prejudices， were able to prevail upon themselves to appear as advocates for this trade. "The slaves in the West Indies，" they said， "are contented with their situation， they are not conscious of the evils against which you exclaim； why then should you endeavour to alter their condition？"
The true answer to this question， even granting them their fact， would be： "It is not very material to a man of a liberal and enlarged mind， whether they are contented or no. Are they contented？ I am not contented for them.